AI forecasting
Why six forecasters now expect a superhuman AI researcher in 2027
All six authors of the AI Futures Project’s new forecast expect an AI that out-researches the best human AI researchers sometime in 2027. Three months ago the one who expected it soonest put even odds on it arriving by the end of 2028. The biggest reason is one estimate, that AI is now making AI progress go about 1.7 times as fast as it used to.
- A METR estimate was the biggest reason. METR estimated that Anthropic now makes AI progress about twice as fast as before October 2025, mostly because of AI. The forecasters read that as a 1.7x speed-up from AI alone, which their August models had given less than a 4% chance.
- A 1.7x pace needs much more than 1.7x faster researchers. In the authors’ model, making researchers 1.7 times as fast speeds up overall progress by only about 1.03 times.
- A straight line from today reaches a superhuman AI researcher in late 2027. Changing one assumption at a time moves the date between February 2027 and December 2028.
- The group’s model, told about 1.7x, puts it in early 2027. With Kokotajlo’s settings, about 1 in 80 simulated futures matched the measured pace. Of those, 90% reached a superhuman AI researcher before 2028.
- Much of the evidence is hidden. Anthropic redacted most of what METR found most informative, and a METR team without inside access saw much less speed-up in preliminary numbers.
Eli Lifland is a forecaster at the AI Futures Project, the nonprofit group behind the scenario AI 2027. In August he gave even odds that AI would be better than top human experts at virtually every task by July 2032. On 10 November the group published a timelines update titled “Looks Like the Intelligence Explosion Will Happen in 2027 After All.” Its six authors, among them Lifland and Daniel Kokotajlo, each give a median for each milestone. A median is the date by which the forecaster thinks the milestone is as likely to have happened as not.
In August, Lifland’s median for AI that beats top experts at nearly everything was July 2032. Where did he put it on 10 November?
September 2028, almost four years earlier. The other four authors in the chart moved earlier too, each by at least 14 months.
In August, Kokotajlo, the member of the group with the earliest dates, gave a superhuman AI researcher even odds of arriving before 2029. Now all six authors put their median for it in 2027.
The single biggest source of evidence, they write, was a 5 November report from METR, a nonprofit that tests AI systems, which an earlier post here walks through. METR estimated that Anthropic now improves its models about twice as fast as before October 2025, and guessed that “perhaps ≈80%” of the extra speed comes from AI. Without AI’s share, the pace would have risen only from 1 to 1.2, so the forecasters credit AI with 2 ÷ 1.2, or about 1.7x. In August their own computer model of AI progress, run with Kokotajlo’s inputs, gave a speed-up that large by November 2026 less than a 4% chance.
The target is an AI that out-researches the best researcher
The update tracks two milestones. The nearer one is the superhuman AI researcher, or SAR.
The authors define a SAR as “an AI that matches the research taste of the best human researchers at an AGI company and can fully automate its coding.” Research taste is “the ability to select research directions and experiments, and interpret their results.” An AGI company is one trying to build artificial general intelligence, AI that can do most of the work people do. Roughly, a company with a SAR would rather fire all its human researchers and run on AI alone than keep a team of the world’s best researchers with no AI.
The farther one is top-expert-dominating AI, or TED-AI, which they describe as AI “better than top human experts at virtually all tasks.” Both sit on a ladder that ends at superintelligence, which an earlier post here explains. Most of the update is about SAR, which the team thinks could be a “point of no return.” An AI that does AI research better than any person can be set to work on the next AI, and that one on the one after. This loop is called recursive self-improvement.
A 1.7x pace asks far more of AI than a 1.7x faster workforce
A speed-up of 1.7x sounds like AI making each researcher 1.7 times as productive. The authors separate three kinds of speed-up, and METR’s 1.7 is the smallest of them.
- Labor uplift is how much faster researchers get their own work done with AI. Anthropic staff, polled informally, put theirs at 12 times by October 2026, which METR calls “only very loose evidence.”
- Software research uplift is how much faster the company improves its algorithms, the methods it uses to build and train models.
- The pace of progress is how fast the models themselves get better. This is the number METR estimated.
The authors picture AI progress as a car driving up a hill. Its speed is the pace of progress, and its engine is research effort. The hill gets steeper as the car climbs, because the easy improvements get found first.
What does it take to make the car go 1.7 times as fast?
Experiments need computers, and AI has not given the company more of them. With computers held fixed, research effort grows more slowly than researcher speed, so a 3.1 times bigger engine needs researchers working about 7.8 times as fast.
Run in reverse, their model makes researchers 1.7 times as fast with nothing else changed, and overall progress speeds up by only about 1.03 times. In a run of the model tuned to match AI 2027, the pace reaches 1.7x around April 2027, so by this measure, they write, “we are ~5 months ahead of schedule.”
A straight line from today reaches the best researcher in late 2027
The simplest method in the update needs three numbers. The first is how good AI’s research taste is today. For that the authors take Model 4, an internal Anthropic model in use since about 25 September 2026. With Kokotajlo’s settings, its taste sits 3.5 standard deviations below the median Anthropic researcher. A standard deviation, or SD, is the typical distance between a person and the middle of a bell curve, so −3.5 SDs is about the 0.02nd percentile. A SAR needs +3.09 SDs, the best researcher in a thousand.
The second number is how fast taste improves. Kokotajlo’s settings add 3 SDs for every year of progress at the 2025 pace. The third is the pace itself. On AECI, Anthropic’s score that combines many benchmark tests, its models gained about 15 points a year before October 2025 and about 29 points a year since. Each point is then worth 0.2 SDs, so taste climbs 5.8 SDs a year and covers the 6.59 SD gap in about 1.1 years.
Drawn as a straight line with Kokotajlo’s inputs and no further speed-up from AI, today’s pace reaches a superhuman AI researcher around November 2027, about 14 months after Model 4.
They call the method conservative, meaning it probably errs late, because it holds the pace at 29 points a year.
What date do you get with other inputs?
Model 4’s research taste
SDs of taste per year of 2025-pace progress
AECI points a year
Gap 6.59 SD ÷ 5.8 SD a year = 1.1 years
SAR around November 2027, about 14 months after Model 4.
The date is hard to push late. Lifland’s lower slope of 2.3 moves it only to March 2028, and only going back to the old pace of 15 points a year gives December 2028. The authors also ran a Monte Carlo simulation, which draws many random combinations of inputs and records the date each one gives. With Model 4’s taste centered higher, at −1.5 SDs, the median came out at July 2027, and 65% of draws reached SAR by the end of 2027.
Other straight lines land within a year of it
Anthropic publishes a measure of how much of its research AI does. In July 2026 alone it rated about 15,000 research tasks on a six-step scale from Epoch AI. AL stands for automation level, and the scale runs from AL0, where AI “adds nothing,” to AL5, where AI works “end to end with little or no human involvement.”
Who does the work at each level?
AL0, not used. “AI adds nothing.”
AL1, marginal. “Occasionally convenient for lookups, brainstorming, or polishing writeups, but doesn’t change how the work is done or who is doing it.”
AL2, assists. “Meaningful speed ups or improvements to parts of the task; human mostly drives and reviews everything.”
AL3, collaborates. “AI doing large chunks under close human direction; human still makes calls and stitches things together.” Over 90% of Anthropic’s sampled tasks were at this level or above.
AL4, leads. “Completing most of the task end to end from a high-level ask; human supervises, course-corrects, and approves outputs.” Claude led 26% of Anthropic’s sampled tasks in August 2026, up from under 1% in February.
AL5, autonomous. “End to end with little or no human involvement.” Anthropic found no part of its research work at this level.
The share of tasks that Claude leads rose from under 1% in February 2026 to 26% in August, and no part of the work was rated fully autonomous. If SAR arrives when 95% of tasks are fully automated, S-shaped growth curves fitted to these shares put it in November 2027. The authors call their guess about how quickly each level follows the one below it “based on little data.”
A second line follows staff estimates of their own speed-up, which reached 12 times with Model 4. If a SAR is worth roughly a 1,000-fold speed-up for researchers, that trend gets there around August 2028, though taking self-reports “at face value” could make it too fast. Both lines leave out any further speed-up from AI, so the authors count them as conservative. In their summary, the other simple models “predict late 2027 to mid-2028.”
Weaknesses expected to slow AI have not slowed it much
If AI can do 90% of a job instantly and the last 10% still needs a person, the whole job goes at most 10 times faster. This is Amdahl’s law, which Gene Amdahl described for parallel computers in 1967. The authors count this kind of bottleneck among the main reasons people doubted that AI would soon speed up AI research.
How much faster does a project go as AI takes over more of its tasks?
Half the tasks are done by AI, so the project takes half as long, a 2× speed-up.
Today’s models still have weaknesses that were expected to hold progress back, such as tasks whose results are hard to measure. If those weaknesses are not holding progress back much, the bottleneck argument was weaker than skeptics thought. If they are, then Figure 5 applies, and each newly automated task buys a bigger jump than the one before. Either way, the authors write, “you update towards Superhuman AI Researchers being much closer in time than we previously thought.”
The group’s own model finds 2027 once it is told about 1.7x
The group’s main tool is the AI Futures Model, a computer simulation of AI progress feeding back on itself. Each forecaster sets a range for every input, and the model draws many possible futures from those ranges. For this update the authors kept only the futures that showed a 1.7x pace on 1 November 2026. In probability this is called conditioning. It asks what the future looks like, given what was just measured.
What happens to the forecast if you keep only the futures that match what was measured?
The real results, from the AI Futures Model
Kokotajlo’s settings
Lifland’s settings
With Kokotajlo’s settings, only about 1.2% of futures were near 1.7x, roughly 1 in 80. In those, the median SAR date was February 2027, and 90% reached SAR before 2028. The kept futures, the authors write, “probably reach SAR a few months too early.” In the model, the easiest way to reach 1.7x by November is for AI to already have research taste near the median researcher’s. The team thinks today’s models are worse than that. The explanation they rate most plausible for the miss is that AI close to automating all coding speeds research up more than they had assumed.
All six medians fall in 2027
Each author then gave an all-things-considered forecast, blending the methods with judgment. All six put their SAR median in 2027, from May for Kokotajlo to November for Finnveden and Larsen. Their TED-AI medians run from September 2027 to September 2028, and each gives TED-AI between a 35% and a 65% chance of arriving before 2028.
Kokotajlo had written down in advance what would shorten his forecast, including AI revenue growing fourfold or more in 2026. Revenue, he writes, “seems to have gone up about 6x.” Lifland lists what pulls him the other way, including “a nagging feeling that the update feels so large without being based on commensurate evidence,” and markets that did not react to the METR report. He adds that this kind of instinct “has performed very poorly for me in the past.”
Most of the evidence is out of public view
METR wrote that “Anthropic redacted a majority of the evidence we found most informative for these conclusions.” The doubling has some public support in a benchmark chart. The 80% share, and so the 1.7, has “no comparable public support,” the authors write.
- METR warns that much of its evidence comes from “well-specified tasks that are easy to grade automatically.” If models are improving faster on clean tasks than on messy real work, the real speed-up is smaller.
- A second METR team, without inside access, found “much less of a speed-up” on a similar measure in preliminary numbers.
- Larsen points to an explanation with no help from AI. Anthropic may have shifted computing power toward reinforcement learning, a training method that rewards a model for correct answers. That raises benchmark scores more directly than improving pretraining, the first stage of training on large amounts of text.
- Anthropic’s system card for Claude Mythos 5.2, the technical report published with the model, says only that it “does not double the internal rate of overall aggregate progress in AI research and development.” The authors note that Mythos 5.2 does not seem to be Model 4.
The authors still mostly trust METR. Before the assessment, its staff expected advanced AI no sooner than the authors did, so the result went against what they expected to find.
The authors argue for a pause
If SAR arrives in 2027, the authors write, “an industry-wide pause on AI R&D should be the top priority for the AI industry, the US government, and the entire world.” They judge that companies “are not on track to align a SAR,” meaning they cannot yet make sure it pursues the goals its builders intend. They also worry about security. “If we train SAR in the immediate future, the algorithms will probably leak to China, and maybe the model weights too.”
Every date in this post assumes nobody slows AI development on purpose more than in the recent past. A pause of the kind the authors call for would move all of them.
Two pieces of evidence are due soon. The authors expect the METR team without inside access to publish its numbers “in the next couple of days.” Anthropic’s system card says the company “will discuss overall trends in acceleration in a future report.”
Further reading
- AI Futures Project, Q3.5 Timelines Update: Looks Like the Intelligence Explosion Will Happen in 2027 After All (10 November 2026). The update, with every method’s tables and each author’s reasoning.
- METR, Independent Assessment of AI R&D Acceleration at Anthropic in October 2026 (5 November 2026). Where the doubling and the 80% come from.
- The AI Futures Model. The simulation, with each author’s settings, which readers can change.
- Ajeya Cotra, AI is dramatically accelerating AI research right now (6 November 2026). Another forecaster’s reading of the METR report.